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Is the Supreme Court's recent decision in Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin' monumental or inconsequential?
Is it a major or a minor addition to the jurisprudence on
* Gordon Rosen Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. This Article is
based on a talk given at a joint program of the Constitutional Law and Education
Law sections of the Association of American Law Schools at its annual conference in
January 2013. I am grateful to my fellow panelists and the audience for comments
on that occasion. Thank you to Randy Bezanson, Marc DeGirolami, Rick Garnett,
Mae Kuykendall, Kara Larson, Michael Olivas, and Fred Schauer for comments on
written drafts.
1. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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affirmative action in higher education? The early returns suggest
that a consensus is forming around the latter conclusion.
Post-decision commentary on SCOTUSblog tells the story.
While calling Fisher "a break with the Court's earlier decisions on
affirmative action in higher education," Richard Sander cautioned
that "[t]his is not the sweeping repudiation of racial preferences
that many conservatives hoped for."2 After all the excitement
about the case, Elise Boddie wrote, the opinion "fizzles. It charts
no new doctrinal territory but instead reads more like a hornbook
on strict scrutiny."3  The big news about Fisher, Olatunde
Johnson concluded, was that there was "no big news." In the
world of constitutional law casebooks, there are major cases and
there are squibs. Fisher, on this view, is a squib.
Not much background is needed to see why this consensus
formed, either as a matter of good-faith analysis or for more
strategic reasons. In Grutter v. Bollinger,s the University of
Michigan law school case, the Supreme Court upheld an
affirmative action program for law school admissions. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's majority opinion gave such broad latitude
to the law school's own determinations that the decision was
widely viewed as applying something less or different from the
ostensible standard of strict scrutiny that the Court purported to
apply.6  Noting that twenty-five years had passed since its
2. Richard Sander, Commentary on Fisher: A classic Kennedy compromise,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 4:18 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=165770.
3. Elise Boddie, Commentary on Fisher: In with a bang, out with a fizzle,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 11:05 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=165809.
4. Olatunde Johnson, Commentary: Fisher's big news: No big news,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2013, 11:12 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=165811.
5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
6. See Ian Ayres & Sydney Foster, Don't Tell, Don't Ask: Narrow Tailoring After
Grutter and Gratz, 85 TEX. L. REV. 517, 519 (2007) (declaring that the Court's
decisions in the University of Michigan cases "represent a sea-change in the
requirement that affirmative action plans be 'narrowly tailored' to further a
compelling government interest"); Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A
Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1721-28 (2005) (arguing that the
majority in Grutter altered or worked around existing doctrinal categories and tests,
including the elements of the strict scrutiny test); Martin D. Carcieri, Grutter v.
Bollinger and Civil Disobedience, 31 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 360 (2006) ("Justice
O'Connor simply abandoned strict scrutiny in Grutter."); Leslie Yalof Garfield, Back
to Bakke: Defining the Strict Scrutiny Test for Affirmative Action Policies Aimed at
Achieving Diversity in the Classroom, 83 NEB. L. REV. 631, 633-34 (2005) (describing
Grutter, approvingly, as having applied a "new strict scrutiny test"); Nelson Lund,
Justice Kennedy's Stricter Scrutiny and the Future of Racial Diversity Promotion,
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seminal decision in Bakke,' Justice O'Connor also wrote: "We
expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will
no longer be necessary to further the interest [in student
diversity] approved today."' That language was seen as
indicating the Court's hope that it might keep higher education
affirmative action cases off its docket for a substantial period of
time, while warning that its decision came with an effective
sunset provision.9
When the Court granted certiorari in the Fisher case,10 it
seemed as if "later" had come around sooner than expected. With
the retirement of Justice O'Connor and the addition of more
politically conservative personnel on the Court, the fact that the
Court had granted certiorari at all was taken as an indication
that Grutter might be headed for the chopping block." As is so
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAc. GROUPS, Oct. 2008, at 20, 21 ("The Grutter
majority purported to apply a familiar constitutional test, but in fact radically
transformed its meaning."); Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the
Law/Politics Distinction: Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring
Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1473, 1505 n.170 (2007) (arguing that in
Grutter, Justice O'Connor applied "the test of strict scrutiny in a manner that was so
deferential as to be inconsistent with the generally accepted meaning of the test").
7. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
8. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
9. For an early take on this statement, see generally Vikram David Amar &
Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice O'Connor's Closing Comments in
Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541 (2003). As one reader of a draft of this Article
noted, there is a more charitable reading of O'Connor's statement, in which O'Connor
is expressing the hope that by that time, there will be sufficient diversity in the
applicant group in higher education that race-conscious admissions measures will no
longer be necessary. See id. at 541-42 (discussing this possibility); Daniel Kiel, An
Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Reframing the Debate About Law
School Affirmative Action, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 791, 794 (2011) (discussing to same
effect); Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of
Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113, 118-19, 179-81 (2003) (reading
O'Connor's statement as "a potential catalyst" for universities to do more to address
"the achievement gap that makes affirmative action necessary").
10. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012) (mem.).
11. See Stephen Clowney, Doing Affirmative Action, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 27, 27 (2013) ('Most Court watchers predict that the five conservative
justices will vote [in Fisher] to curtail the use of racial preferences."); Ian Haney-
L6pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1782 (2012) ("Given the
emergence of Justice Anthony Kennedy as the swing vote in racial cases, there is also
good reason to fear that the Court will soon end affirmative action in higher
education.") (citing the certiorari grant in Fisher); Ellen D. Katz, Grutter's
Denouement: Three Templates From the Roberts Court, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1045, 1046
(2013) (stating that Fisher "is widely expected to end race-based affirmative action in
higher education").
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often the case, the swing vote in Fisher was expected to be that of
Justice. Anthony Kennedy, whose dissent in Grutter expressed
strong skepticism about the majority's application of strict
scrutiny. 12 The prediction of a major shift in doctrine was not
unreasonable.
In the event, it didn't quite happen. To his credit, Justice
Kennedy is remarkably consistent: He never fails to disappoint.
Writing for a 7-1 Court, with Justice Elena Kagan not
participating in the decision, Kennedy concluded that the Fifth
Circuit, which had upheld the use of race by the University of
Texas in its undergraduate admissions process, "did not apply the
correct standard of strict scrutiny" and remanded the case for
further proceedings by the court below.13 The use of affirmative
action in higher education survived, but with the important
caveat that the Court would henceforth insist on genuine strict
scrutiny in evaluating such programs.
So it makes sense that there would be a push to describe
Fisher as "no big deal."1 4 As a matter of doctrinal analysis, there
is at least some truth to it, compared to what might have
happened. Grutter was not overruled, and affirmative action
survived, at least in theory-although the Court certainly
signaled that such programs would face more rigorous review."
12. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-95 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
13. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013).
14. See Johnson, supra note 4.
15. For arguments that universities will still manage to meet those standards by
hook or by crook, see, e.g., Clowney, supra note 11, at 33 (predicting that if the Court
"announce[d] the end of affirmative action" for universities in Fisher, some
universities would "simply tweak their definitions of merit to include qualitative
factors that track closely with race," thus "more or less preserv[ing] the status quo");
Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Inevitable Irrelevance of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence,
39 J.C. & U.L. 1, 3-5 (2013) (arguing that a predicted ruling in Fisher much like the
one we got could leave universities "free to construct some type of race-preference
admissions policy in an effort to ensure diversity among their classes," but that
wholly external pressures might deter schools from doing so regardless of what the
courts held); Katz, supra note 11, at 1051-55 (predicting as one possible outcome of
Fisher more or less what happened-that Justice Kennedy would insist on a stricter
scrutiny of means while leaving the basic end of student diversity untouched, leaving
universities "free to consider race in admissions so long as they do so the way
administrators at the University of Michigan Law School once did"). For an
argument that Fisher, while not a total victory for affirmative action opponents, will
indeed make it harder for universities to maintain such programs, see Roger Clegg,
Commentary on Fisher: Better off than we were a year ago, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24,
2013, 5:39 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/commentary-on-fisher-better-off-
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At the same time, the "no big deal" conclusion seems to
undersell the extent to which courts are now instructed to
conduct a genuinely strict scrutiny of university admissions
programs and demand a meaningful inquiry into whether those
programs are narrowly tailored. From a tactical standpoint,
however, if you are a supporter of affirmative action, underselling
the possible effects of Fisher also makes sense. It's generally good
strategy to accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative.
Sea-change or squib? You decide.
In this Article, I focus on roughly the same issue-what
Fisher means for strict scrutiny, "critical mass," and other aspects
of judicial review of affirmative action in higher education
admissions programs-but from a different perspective. As with
most of my work in this area, my interest has less to do with
affirmative action or equal protection as such. Rather, my
concern is with what the affirmative action cases say about the
general relationship between courts and universities, particularly
with respect to academic freedom. 16
From this perspective, what I find most striking about
Fisher-especially the dueling opinions that emerged from the
Fifth Circuit prior to review in the Supreme Court-is what it
says about competing judicial conceptions of the university itself.
That is so in two respects. First, the discussions in Fisher-and
elsewhere, including in other decisions of the Supreme Court-
reveal a couple of different visions of the purposes of a university.
No less important, they reveal competing views about where and
how debates about the university should be undertaken and
settled. Is the question fundamentally one for universities
themselves to decide? Or are courts themselves entitled to
establish, as a matter of law, a definition of the purpose and
nature of the university-and, if so, how fixed should that
definition be?
Second, the decisions in Fisher and in other cases suggest a
than-we-were-a-year-agol.
16. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS (2013) [hereinafter
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS]; Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061 (2008) [hereinafter Horwitz, Deference]; Paul Horwitz,
Universities as First Amendment Institutions: Some Easy Answers and Hard
Questions, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1497 (2007) [hereinafter Horwitz, Universities]; Paul




growing judicial mistrust of universities altogether: an increasing
unwillingness to defer to them on core questions of academic
functioning. This may not be surprising, in an era in which the
headlines are filled with talk of the failure to prevent child sexual
abuse at Pennsylvania State University, skyrocketing tuition
costs, and other seeming breakdowns in the system of higher
education. But the distrust runs deeper than any particular
incident, reflecting in part a view on the part of some judges that
universities are active in, and on the wrong side of, the culture
wars. And it has implications that run broader than any
particular incident or occasion for judicial review and may leave
judges inclined to be more distrustful and less deferential, even in
core academic freedom cases.
Both trends-the presence of competing visions of the
university, and the increase in judicial distrust of the university
as an autonomous institution-may be a reflection of what is
already going on in other academic freedom cases. Or they may
represent something new, a change with potential implications
for future academic freedom cases. Perhaps both are partly true.
In any event, I disagree with both trends. I believe courts should
defer substantially to universities and that in doing so they
should leave open some space for institutional pluralism: for the
possibility that different, but equally constitutionally legitimate
and protected, conceptions of the university can and should
coexist within the broader academy.
To the extent that courts have moved away from both views,
however, I suggest that a good portion of the fault lies with the
universities themselves. We live in an era of generalized distrust
for institutions, and universities have hardly emerged unscathed.
If they want to retain or revive meaningful legal and/or
constitutional autonomy and continue to be able to make their
own decisions for themselves, the universities are going to have to
work hard to make sure that judges, and others, understand
them-and, above all, trust them.1 7
17. I make similar arguments about other institutions in HORWITZ, FIRST
AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 156 (the press), 159-61 (same), 267-70
(distrust of institutions in general), and Paul Horwitz, Act III of the Ministerial
Exception, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 973 (2012) [hereinafter Horwitz, Ministerial Exception]
(arguing that the legal autonomy of religious institutions must be accompanied by
self-criticism by those institutions and their members, as well as non-members'
scrutiny of those institutions' behavior).
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I discuss competing conceptions of the university in Section
I. Section II focuses on competing views concerning judicial
deference to academic decisions by universities. Section III
discusses the importance to these issues of the increasing distrust
of institutions, including academic institutions.
I. COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY
One of the most curious features of the Supreme Court's
decision in Grutter-and one of the likeliest explanations, as a
doctrinal matter at least,18 for the gentle form of "strict" scrutiny
the Court applied in that case-is that it is an Equal Protection
case that is subtended in a somewhat odd fashion by the First
Amendment."9 The First Amendment entered into the calculus in
the Court's consideration of whether the University of Michigan's
law school had "a compelling interest in attaining a diverse
student body."20  In holding that it did, the Court made the
following statement:
The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is
essential to its educational mission is one to which we
defer. .. . Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law
School is no less strict for taking into account complex
educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within
the expertise of the university. Our holding today is in
keeping with our tradition of giving a degree of deference to a
university's academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits. . .. We have long recognized that, given
the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in
our constitutional tradition .. . . Our conclusion that the
Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse student
body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional
mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a university is
"presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary."2 1
18. For expressions of doubt that this doctrinal move was wholly sincere, see
HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 125-26.
19. See generally Horwitz, Grutter, supra note 16 (exploring the relationship
between Grutter and the First Amendment).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
21. Id. at 328-29 (citations omitted).
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Characteristically for Supreme Court pronouncements on
academic freedom, this statement is filled with ambiguities and
generalities, making it hard to see with clarity exactly what it
means or where its limits lie in practice.2 2 It is hardly surprising
that such a broad statement, so pregnant with promise and
effusive about both the importance and the expertise of the
university, seemed to overspill its bounds in Grutter itself,
leading to a strict scrutiny discussion that was as deferential in
the narrow tailoring portion of the analysis as it was in the
compelling interest portion.
Still, we can tease out two distinct points in this statement.
Both points are relevant to the analysis in this Article. The first
has to do with the constitutional value of academic freedom itself.
On this view, as the Court puts it, "universities occupy a special
niche in our constitutional tradition,"2 3 one that is undergirded by
the First Amendment. As Justice Brennan put it in one case,
which represented a pre-Grutter high-water mark for the
constitutional rhetoric of academic freedom:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore
a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the
classroom. 24
The second point concerns deference. As the Grutter Court
pointed out, there is a substantial tradition of judicial deference
to "complex educational judgments ... that lie[ ] primarily within
the expertise of the university."25  The Court has written that
judges are ill-equipped to make decisions concerning "the
multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty
members of public educational institutions-decisions that
22. The dean of academic freedom law, J. Peter Byrne, put it best in his classic
article on constitutional academic freedom: "The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are
inconclusive, the promise of their rhetoric reproached by the ambiguous realities of
academic life." J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251, 252-53 (1989) [hereinafter Byrne, Academic
Freedom].
23. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
24. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
25. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; see, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S.
214, 225 (1985); Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90-92
(1978).
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require 'an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are]
not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or
administrative decisionmaking."'26  So there are, in fact, two
important aspects of academic freedom as a legal concept: judicial
protection of academic freedom as a constitutional right (or at
least a constitutional sensibility), and judicial deference to the
expertise of the university when it makes academic judgments.2 7
Importantly, both aspects imply or require some underlying
vision of what the university is: how and why it functions, and
what aspects of its activities fall within the scope of concern of
academic freedom. Universities do all sorts of things. They field
football teams, secure patents, raise money, hire and fire janitors
and engineers-and, yes, occasionally they are involved in
teaching, research, and service. Neither courts nor academics are
equally concerned with all these activities as a matter of
academic freedom. They are concerned only with the "academic
decisions" of a university. 28 As a First Amendment matter, non-
academic decisions are likely to fall outside the scope of the
constitutional right of academic freedom (if such a right exists).
As a matter of deference, courts are supposed to defer to "complex
educational judgments,"29 not to anything and everything a
university does, much of which judges will consider routine
material for judicial decision-making.30
In short, "'[a]cademic' must itself be defined so that those
[legal] boundaries can come clearly into view."31 As Mark Yudof
warned some years ago: "If academic freedom is thought to
include all that is desirable for academicians, it may come to
26. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (alteration in
original) (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90).
27. See Horwitz, Universities, supra note 16, at 1501; Horwitz, Deference, supra
note 16, at 1128-29.
28. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (emphasis added).
29. See, e.g., id.
30. Cf. Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey
Martin, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 278-79, 284-87 (noting the willingness of judges,
including appellate judges without the benefit of direct participation in the trial
process, to "determine controversies involving topics about which the judges
themselves are not expert"). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON
JUDGING (2013) (discussing the problems that judges face deciding cases in an age of
complexity, and the decisional tools they attempt to use to get around those
problems, often badly).
31. STANLEY FISH, VERSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM: FROM PROFESSIONALISM
TO REVOLUTION (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 9) (on file with author).
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mean quite little to policy makers and courts."32 n short, in
order to protect academic freedom, we have to define it.33 And to
do that, we need some understanding or definition of the
university itself: what it does, what lies at the heart of its
mission, which of its actions are particular to its functioning as a
university and which would be undertaken by any large
institution, and so on.
Enter the Fifth Circuit. The panel decision in Fisher is
striking because it places in the foreground two very different
judicial visions of the university, and of the overarching question
of who gets to decide what a university is and what its mission
consists of. Those visions have a substantial effect on the judges'
differing approaches and the results they recommend. Both of
them are worth setting out in detail.
A. JUDGE HIGGINBOTHAM'S JUDICIAL VISION: A DEFERENTIAL
APPROACH BASED ON AN EXPANSiVE VIEW OF THE UNIVERSITY
Judge Patrick Higginbotham wrote for the panel in Fisher.
Near the beginning of his opinion, Judge Higginbotham, drawing
heavily on Grutter, describes "three distinct educational
objectives served by the diversity [Justice O'Connor]
envisioned."34  Those objectives are to improve educational
quality by increasing the number of perspectives available in the
classroom; to better prepare students as professionals; and to
encourage and enhance civic engagement.35
Although most of these objectives arguably fall pretty
squarely within what is widely understood as the traditional
32. Mark G. Yudof, Intramural Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to
Professor Finkin, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1357 (1988); see also Philip Hamburger, More
is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 837 (2004) (asking "whether the definition of any right
can be expanded without risking access to the right," because a right that is defined
too broadly may "stimulate demands for a diminution of its availability"); Frederick
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L.
REV. 265, 276 (1981) ("As a matter more of political and sociological fact than of
necessary logical correlation, rights can more plausibly be absolute when the range of
coverage is narrow. Conversely, rights whose coverage is too broad are likely to offer
little in the way of protection.").
33. See generally David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive
Postmodernism?, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1377 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menand ed., 1996)).
34. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated
and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
35. Id. at 219-20.
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mission of the university, it is still noteworthy how Judge
Higginbotham prefaces this discussion: "[Justice O'Connor's]
opinion recognizes that universities do more than simply impart
knowledge to their students."36 Thus, the Higginbotham version
of the university already emphasizes a somewhat broad
understanding of what it does rather than a narrow or
traditionalist one. It stresses that a "diversity of views and
perspectives" is "paramount to a university's educational
mission."37
There are also indications in Higginbotham's opinion of an
acknowledgment of and respect for the possibility of institutional
pluralism. Higginbotham recognizes that different universities
may have different missions and goals. Thus, in describing the
value of educational diversity and its relationship to a
university's mission, Higginbotham writes: "Preparing students
to function as professionals in an increasingly diverse
workforce . .. calls for some consideration of a university's
particular educational mission and the community it serves."3 8 A
"nationally renowned law school," for example, may take
applicants from across the country and "send[] its graduates into
careers in all states; therefore it is appropriate for such a school
to consider national diversity levels when setting goals for its
admissions program."39 Or a university might be committed to
serving local needs, in which case it may adopt "a more tailored
diversity emphasis."4 0 Similarly, to the extent that "foster[ing]
civic engagement and maintain[ing] visibly open paths to
leadership" are part of a university's goals, those goals may
"require[ ] a degree of attention to the [university's] surrounding
community." 41
Note that Higginbotham does not fix in place a particular
mission that applies to all universities. Some may serve a local
community and some a national one; some may seek to foster
civic engagement and some may not. The kinds of goals they
pursue will differ. Presumably, the kinds of actions they take to
36. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated
and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
37. Id. at 236-37.
38. Id. at 237.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Fisher v, Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 237 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated
and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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achieve those goals, and the concomitant constraints on their
actions, will vary accordingly. Higginbotham's approach is thus
not a general blessing of any affirmative action policy,
undertaken using any metrics the university wishes. Rather, it
defers substantially to university admissions programs only to
the extent that those programs correspond to the university's own
distinct mission.
Given this kind of approach, which takes an expansive and
pluralistic view of the university's purpose, it is hardly surprising
that Higginbotham's view of the role of the courts in assessing a
university's academic decisions, including admissions decisions, is
highly deferential. He accepts both the authority-based and the
epistemically-based justifications for judicial deference in
university cases, emphasizing a right of "educational autonomy
grounded in the First Amendment" and asserting that academic
decisions lie "far outside the experience of the courts." 42 And
although he makes a pro forma statement that "the scrutiny
triggered by racial classification 'is no less strict for taking into
account' the special circumstances of higher education ,"'4 he
makes clear that the manner of strict scrutiny in cases involving
universities should focus on the process the university adopts
rather than its substance: "Rather than second-guess the merits
of the University's decision, a task we are ill-equipped to perform,
we instead scrutinize the University's decisionmaking process to
ensure that its decision to adopt a race-conscious admissions
policy followed from the good faith consideration Grutter
requires."44
Moreover, citing Grutter, Higginbotham asserts that even
this process-based scrutiny should begin with a presumption that
"the University acted in good faith."4 5 And he insists, as did the
majority in Grutter, that narrow tailoring 'does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative,'
especially if the proffered alternatives would require the
University to sacrifice other important interests, like its academic
selectivity and reputation for excellence."46
42. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003)), vacated and remanded by 133 S.
Ct. 2411 (2013).
43. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 238 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339-40).
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B. JUDGE GARZA'S JUDICIAL VISION: A LESS DEFERENTIAL
APPROACH BASED ON A NARROW VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE
UNIVERSITY
Judge Emilio Garza filed a special concurrence in the Fisher
panel decision. In his view, although he was obliged to follow
Grutter and the panel opinion represented a "faithful" application
of that decision, Grutter itself was a "misstep," a "digression in
the course of constitutional law," and a "detour from
constitutional first principles."4 7 For Garza, as for many other
critics of Grutter, despite the Court's invocation of strict scrutiny,
"what the Court applied in practice was something else
entirely."48 So Garza concurred in Judge Higginbotham's opinion,
while urging the Supreme Court to take the case and correct its
errors in Grutter.
What is most relevant for present purposes is not Judge
Garza's view of Equal Protection doctrine, but his view of the
purposes of the university itself. Garza writes that "[s]tate
universities are free to define their educational goals as broadly
as needed to serve the public interest," and courts "defer to
educators' professional judgments in setting those goals." 49 But
just as there is an arguable gap between what Judge
Higginbotham says about traditional strict scrutiny and what he
does in his opinion, so there is a gulf between that statement by
Garza and his evident views in the rest of his opinion. He writes:
Notwithstanding an institution's decision to expand its
educational mission more broadly, the university's core
function is to educate students in the physical sciences,
engineering, social sciences, business and the humanities,
among other academic disciplines."o
Garza is not adamant about restricting universities to this
narrow, traditional understanding of their function."
47. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J.,
specially concurring), vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
48. Id. at 248 (Garza, J., specially concurring).
49. Id. at 256-57.
50. Id. at 257.
51. See id. at 258 n.14 ("This is not to criticize universities, like the University of
Texas, for implementing policies that seek to increase minority representation, not
merely for its educational benefits on campus, but also for the secondary benefits
that such increases in minority enrollment can have in the workplace and in society
generally .... I do not question this goal, but rather the constitutionality of using
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Nevertheless, his understanding of the university's "core
function" clearly influences the course of his opinion. Thus, he
rejects the Grutter Court's emphasis on civic engagement as a
justification for affirmative action in university admissions,
arguing that it "has nothing to do with the university's core
education and training functions."52 And he questions whether
there is any good reason for deference to universities that argue
that things like "promoting 'cross-racial understanding' and
enabling students 'to better understand persons of different
races"' are necessary aspects of their "educational goals.""8 These
matters, Garza argues, "could just as easily be facilitated in many
other public settings where diverse people assemble regularly."5 4
He adds: "I do not believe that the university has a monopoly on
furthering these societal goals, or even that the university is in
the best position to further such goals."55
Unsurprisingly, Garza's narrow definition of the university's
mission, and his skepticism that universities have any special
role or expertise with respect to broader goals, color his own
application of strict scrutiny. His vision leaves little room for the
kind of respect for "complex educational judgments in an area
that lies primarily within the expertise of the university" that
Grutter and the academic freedom jurisprudence command, 6
precisely because he doubts that racially conscious admissions
policies fall within the expertise of the university. Thus, he
criticizes Grutter's reliance on the "educational benefits of
diversity" arguments advanced by the University of Michigan in
that case and by the University of Texas in Fisher, arguing that
"it remains suspended at the highest levels of hypothesis and
speculation."," He is skeptical that anyone, including the
university, is capable of testing or judging whether "a critical
mass of minority students could perceptibly improve the quality
of classroom learning."5 8 Far from presuming the good faith of
the university, he argues that its findings could be manipulated
race to attain it.").
52. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 258 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated
and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
53. Id. at 257.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
57. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 255.
58. Id.
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to achieve a desired result. 9
In short, two related currents run through Judge Garza's
special concurrence: a narrow, traditionalist view of the "core
function" of the university, and a strong skepticism that anything
it says or any studies it conducts in support of a broader vision-
or, indeed, in support of the view that race-conscious admissions
are central to the core function of educating students-is either
valid or based on meaningful expert opinion. Garza's vision of the
university colors his views on whether the university is acting in
good faith and how much deference is due to it. Conversely, his
lack of deference is clearly influenced by his view that
universities have wandered far afield from their core function, are
acting in areas about which they know little, and are
indistinguishable in those areas from any other public institution.
The two opinions in the Fisher panel opinion thus suggest
two competing visions of the university. The vision offered by
Judge Higginbotham suggests that diversity can be a strong,
almost independent interest for the modern university, and more
generally that universities should not be understood as simply
"impart[ing] knowledge" to students.o It also suggests the
possibility that there is no single "core" function, narrowly
understood, of the university. Rather, different universities can
serve a plurality of purposes, purposes that vary depending on a
university's "particular educational mission" and "the community
it serves.""1 Judge Garza's vision of the university, in contrast, is
narrow and traditional, emphasizing that "the university's core
function is to educate students in the physical sciences,
engineering, social sciences, business and the humanities, among
other academic disciplines." 62 This vision leads him to refuse to
give much credit or deference to aims that arguably fall outside
the scope of that core function.
C. COMPETING VISIONS OF THE UNIVERSITY IN THE SUPREME
COURT
Put to one side for now the Supreme Court's own decision in
59. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 255 (5th Cir. 2011),
vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see also Fisher, 631 F.3d at 255
n.10.
60. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 219 (Higginbotham, J.).
61. Id. at 237.
62. Id. at 257.
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Fisher, which focuses less on the function of the university and
more on the role of deference." Similar disagreements about the
purpose of the university also crop up from time to time
elsewhere in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. On the
High Court, too, the doctrinal argument between the justices
concerning academic freedom is sometimes subtly influenced by
the justices' competing visions concerning what the university
exists to do and who gets the final word on that question.
The Higginbotham vision-one that is characterized by
respect for the potential breadth of the university's mission and
the possibility of institutional pluralism within the universe of
higher educational institutions-appears in the Supreme Court
mostly indirectly, by hints and signs. It is somewhat apparent in
Justice John Paul Stevens's concurrence in Widmar v. Vincent.64
There, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's fairly mechanical
use of public forum doctrine to evaluate a university speech
controversy, arguing that "the use of the terms 'compelling state
interest' and 'public forum' to analyze the question presented in
this case may needlessly undermine the academic freedom of
public universities."6
Stevens did not expressly speak in terms of varied university
missions. To the contrary, he spoke in fairly basic terms about
universities' "learning and teaching missions."6 6 More broadly,
however, the central point of his concurrence was to emphasize
that "the managers of a university routinely make countless
decisions based on the content of communicative materials" and
student extracurricular activities,6 7 and that the decision of how
to allocate its resources should be left to the university itself.
Thus, in deciding between two competing uses by a student group
of a room in the university, one devoted to the classics and one to
"Mickey Mouse cartoons . . , a university should [be] allowed to
decide for itself whether a program that illuminates the genius of
Walt Disney should be given precedence over one that may
duplicate material adequately covered in the classroom."6 8
Of course, this standard is primarily about deference. But
63. See infra Section II.
64. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
65. Id. at 277-78 (Stevens, J., concurring in the result).
66. Id. at 278.
67. Id. at 278-79.
68. Id. at 278.
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note that Stevens does not argue that either decision by the
university-whether to privilege Shakespeare or Walt Disney-
would be presumptively right or wrong. Rather, he leaves the
decision to the university itself and implicitly recognizes that
different universities may make different reasonable choices in
allocating their own resources. Thus, in effect if not in intent,
Justice Stevens's vision of the university leaves room for
institutional pluralism in the implementation of the "learning
and teaching missions" of the university. Just as important, he
sees that decision as belonging to universities, not courts.
Justice Stevens's banner was taken up, briefly, by Justice
David Souter. The similarity of approach is apparent in Souter's
concurrence in Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin
System v. Southworth,69 a case involving the constitutionality of
mandatory student activity fees. As with the majority opinion in
Widmar, the case was decided by the majority using fairly
conventional and mechanical doctrinal tools. It was this
approach to which Souter objected. 70 For Souter, other "sources
of law" might be more relevant to deciding the case.7
One of those sources consisted of "First Amendment and
related cases grouped under the umbrella of academic freedom."7 2
A key principle of those cases was that "universities and schools
should have the freedom to make decisions about how and what
to teach."7 3 Although in his view the cases had never firmly
asserted an absolute right of universities to autonomy qua
universities, and the courts were still obliged to consider the
speech rights of students within universities, it was "enough to
say that protecting a university's discretion to shape its
educational mission may prove to be an important consideration
in First Amendment analysis of objections to student fees."74
69. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
70. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring in the result) ("I agree that the University's scheme is
permissible, but do not believe that the Court should take the occasion to impose a
cast-iron viewpoint neutrality requirement to uphold it.").
71. Id.
72. Id. at 237; see also id. at 237 n.3 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
250 (1957) (plurality opinion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
73. Southworth, 529 U.S. at 237.
74. Id. at 239 (citations omitted).
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Again, this language has more to do with judicial deference
to universities than with the function of universities. But in
recognizing the importance of academic autonomy and the right
of a university to "shape its educational mission," Souter
necessarily suggests that a university's own vision of its mission,
and of the role of universities generally, may differ from the
vision offered by the courts; when these visions differ, the
university's vision must take precedence. Indeed, under Souter's
approach, "acceptance of the most general statement of academic
freedom" might even render acceptable a public university's
decision to impose student speech codes,"5 a bate noire of those
who advance a more traditional view of the status of free speech
within the university.
Compare this with Justice Alito's vision of the university in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.76 In that case, the Supreme
Court upheld Hastings College of the Law's use of an "all-comers"
nondiscrimination policy for student groups to withdraw official
recognition from the law school's chapter of the Christian Legal
Society." As with Southworth, the case was decided using
standard, acontextual doctrinal tools such as public forum
doctrine." Thus, the majority opinion itself said little about
universities and their mission(s).
In dissent, however, Justice Alito objected sharply to the
decision in terms that left little doubt that he hewed closely to a
more traditionalist vision of the university. Alito argued that the
majority's decision stood for the principle that there should be "no
freedom for expression that offends prevailing standards of
political correctness in our country's institutions of higher
learning."79 Contrasting the decision with the Court's earlier
decision in Healy v. James,80 Alito emphasized that the Healy
Court had refused to defer to university administrators with
respect to how to achieve their "educational objectives," and there
was "no reason why we should bow to university administrators"
75. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 & n.5
(2000).
76. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
77. Id. at 2993-95 (describing the "all-comers" policy as one that "draws no
distinction between groups based on their message or perspective" and "require[s] all
student groups to accept all comers").
78. See HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 136.
79. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 3000 (Alito, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 3007-09 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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in the present case."'
This is suggestive language only, to be sure. But it presents
a fairly striking contrast with opinions like those of Souter and
Stevens, which suggest that universities may contain a multitude
of different visions and goals and that courts should not impose
upon them a particular mission or set of policies-no matter how
laudable or consistent with the traditional understanding of
universities it may be. For Justice Alito, as for Judge Garza,
there simply is a particular set of core functions or norms that
govern the university-one that happens to resemble the
standard depiction of a university in the pages of the National
Review circa 1993. Any departure from that understanding of
what universities exist to do will be judged non-deferentially, if
not harshly.
To be clear, I am not endorsing a particular vision of the
university here. I am not saying, for example, that seeking
student diversity is not just permissible but mandatory for
universities-that student diversity is an indefeasible part of the
mission of every university. Nor am I suggesting that the
traditionalist view of the university advanced by judges such as
Garza and Alito, one in which teaching and learning on core
subjects is the fundamental purpose of every university and
"political correctness" should be anathema on campus, is wholly
illegitimate. To the contrary, there is much to be said for Alito's
picture of the university. Indeed, something like this traditional
view has been defended quite eloquently by some of the greatest
champions of constitutional academic freedom.82
What interests me is simply the fact of the dispute, and
especially its location. The role of the university, and the
concomitant boundaries of the professional and legal norms of
academic freedom that protect that role, is hotly debated within
the university itself.83 The different visions of the university that
81. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3008 (2010); see also
Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 187 (1972).
82. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter:
Getting Real About the "Four Freedoms" of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 929,
951, 953 (2006) (asserting that "constitutional academic freedom protects the core
intellectual missions of the university: research, scholarship, and liberal education,"
and arguing that other goals, such as "[i]nculcation of human values or modeling of
professional values," are peripheral to those core missions).
83. See Horwitz, Universities, supra note 16, at 1546; Horwitz, Grutter, supra
note 16, at 479-81; Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 22, at 279-81.
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figure in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Fisher, and that can be
seen in scattered opinions by individual Supreme Court justices,
suggest that the same debates exist on the courts as well.
Although he defends a fairly traditional view of the purpose of the
university, J. Peter Byrne has called American universities
"dazzlingly diverse" in their aims and "full of conflicting
purposes," both individually and as a whole.84 It is ultimately
that form of institutional diversity-not the racial diversity of
students that is the focus of cases like Grutter and Fisher, but the
plurality of missions and aims that may characterize a modern
university-that drives opinions like Judge Higginbotham's.
Others, like Judge Garza, insist that universities have a
particular mission, that it is easily identifiable, and that they are
perfectly comfortable as judges declaring what it is.
These competing visions are bound to affect outcomes in
cases involving universities. They may do so directly, in cases
involving standard disputes over academic freedom. Since
Garcetti v. Ceballos,85 for example, the law concerning speech by
public employees has held that public employers may discipline
employees for statements made in the course of their
"professional duties."8 Justice Souter worried that such a rule
would "imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom
in public colleges and universities,"8 7 and the majority in Garcetti
left open the question whether the rule announced in the case
"would apply in the same manner to a case involving speech [by
an academic] related to scholarship or teaching."8 8 How such a
case would play out might turn on what a court concludes about
the scope of the professional duties of academics. Similarly,
courts are sometimes called upon to decide disputes over the
circumstances in which university administrators can take action
against professors who arguably depart from proper classroom or
scholarly standards. How they resolve those questions may turn
on whether courts believe that universities have the primary say
about such matters, or whether judges will instead step in as self-
proclaimed defenders of core academic values against those who
would "impose [a] straightjacket upon the intellectual leaders in
84. J. Peter Byrne, Neo-Orthodoxy in Academic Freedom, 88 TEX. L. REV. 143, 170
(2009) (book review).
85. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
86. Id. at 426.
87. Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 425.
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our colleges."" Or, as in Fisher, they may affect the outcome
indirectly. Judges' views about the scope of discretion allowed to
universities in admissions programs and other areas may be
influenced by their views about what constitutes an appropriate
mission for a university. A case may only rarely turn openly on a
judge's conception of the role and purpose of universities.
Underneath the doctrinal surface, however, a great deal may
depend on what judges think about the proper mission of the
university.
II. COMPETING VIEWS ON JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
ACADEMIC DECISIONS
What judges think about the purpose of the university is
closely tied to another question: How much judicial deference is
owed to universities? This question played a central part in the
debate over the University of Texas's admissions program in
Fisher, both in the Fifth Circuit and in the Supreme Court itself.
As we saw earlier, Judge Higginbotham's panel opinion in
Fisher rests heavily on deference, beginning with the key phrase
that "the Supreme Court has held that '[c]ontext matters' when
evaluating race-based governmental action, and a university's
educational judgment in developing diversity policies is due
deference."90 Although Higginbotham insists that this deference
does not mean the courts should apply anything less than strict
scrutiny, in practice his strict scrutiny analysis is something less
than the traditional analysis we would expect, for two reasons.
First, he argues that in this context strict scrutiny should focus
on the process by which the university reaches a policy decision
on admissions, not on the substance itself.9" Second, in applying
strict scrutiny he begins with a presumption of good faith on the
part of the university. 92
Thus, even the narrow tailoring portion of the strict scrutiny
89. See Vega v. Miller, 273 F. 3d 460, 474 (2d Cir. 2001) (Cabranes, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original). See generally J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to Constitutional
Academic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79, 79-82 (2004) [hereinafter Byrne, Threat]
(discussing Vega), 92-95 (discussing Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), vacated in part by 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992)).
90. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)), vacated and
remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 231-32.
509
Loyola Law Review
analysis should be "undertaken with a degree of deference to the
University's constitutionally protected, presumably expert
academic judgment." 93 Universities are "engaged in a different
enterprise" from other defendants in affirmative action litigation,
such as governments engaged in public contracting. So long as
their admissions programs operate in "a holistic and
individualized manner," all that matters is that they reasonably
exercised expert judgment and concluded that some admissions
policy was necessary to the achievement of its educational goals.9 4
With this version of strict scrutiny in place, upholding the
University of Texas's admissions plan presented no great
challenge.
I am less concerned here with the details than with the
general impression one receives from Higginbotham's
presentation of the evidence. What it appears to suggest is not
just a formal or mechanical application of deference, but a strong
underlying trust in the university and a respect for its academic
expertise.
That trust and respect are evident in his description of the
University of Texas's actions. "Over the past two decades," he
says at the opening of this discussion, "UT has repeatedly revised
its admissions procedures to reflect its calculus of educational
values while navigating judicial decisions and legislative
mandates."9 5 His description of the university's "calculus" sets
out lovingly and at length the care and thought the university put
into its admissions program, piling detail upon detail to show
that the university operated as an expert, informing itself fully on
the details and limits of its policy and coming up with a "complex
admissions process."" He concludes with a warm commendation
93. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)), vacated and remanded by
133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
94. See id. at 233 (noting Grutter had recognized this characteristic of
universities); see also id. at 238 ('"[N]arrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of
every conceivable race-neutral alternative,' especially if the proffered alternatives
would require the University to sacrifice other important interests, like its academic
selectivity and reputation for excellence." (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter,
539 U.S. at 339-40)). For a general discussion of the difference between judicial
treatment of affirmative action in public contracting and construction cases and in
university cases, see Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1745 (1996).
95. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 222 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
96. Id. at 226; see also id. at 222-30 (discussing and examining in great detail the
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of the university, writing that "it is evident that the efforts of the
University have been studied, serious, and of high purpose,
lending support to a constitutionally protected zone of
discretion."9 Given Higginbotham's evident respect for the
expert efforts undertaken by the university, it is unsurprising
that he rejects any suggestion that courts could oversee its
operations in this area by imposing "fixed numerical guideposts"
on the university.9 8
That sort of trust in universities all but disappears when one
examines the other Fifth Circuit opinions in Fisher. Much of the
reason for this is strictly doctrinal, on the surface at least. As
presented, the problem is not that the University of Texas did not
act sensitively or carefully or was unworthy of trust; it is that the
university's expertise is irrelevant. It may matter in applying the
compelling interest strand of strict scrutiny, although even here
Judge Garza is doubtful. But it certainly has nothing to do with
the narrow tailoring strand, which "the Court [wrongly]
redefined" in Grutter to remove its sting.99 By deferring so much,
by vesting universities with so much unguided discretion to
determine that a program is the least restrictive means of
achieving its educational goals, Grutter renders "meaningful
judicial review all but impossible."1 00 On the surface, then, the
problem is not so much that the University of Texas acted badly.
Rather, the problem is that its program was not subjected to an
independent judicial review of the means the university adopted
toward the achievement of its educational goals.
Beneath the surface, however, one senses the distrust
bubbling up. Garza's language is shot through with suspicion.
Universities like the University of Michigan Law School and the
University of Texas, he writes, "can get away with something
less" than what the Constitution requires given the laxity of the
university's admissions policies).
97. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328), vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
98. Id. at 245.
99. See id. at 249, 256-57 (Garza, J., specially concurring) (agreeing that
universities are entitled to deference in setting educational goals, but adding, "My
concern . . . is not that Grutter commands such deference, but that it conflated the
deference owed to a university's asserted interest with deference to the means used
to attain it.").
100. Id. at 251.
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narrow tailoring analysis. 101 Judicial deference to universities,
especially when combined with a presumption that they are
acting in good faith, leaves those schools with "a peculiarly low
bar" to leap. 10 2 Universities, having been given the green light by
the Court in Grutter, will "do covertly" what they cannot do
openly-will, in other words, employ subterfuge, a conclusion that
hardly entitles the university to much judicial deference. 0 3
Given Judge Garza's strong distrust of the university, even
the deference that ought to be accorded to a university's expert
judgment about its own goals is lacking here. Any determination
by universities that racial or other forms of student diversity are
an important part of their admissions programs that satisfies the
compelling interest standard "remains suspended at the highest
levels of hypothesis and speculation," he writes.104 The facts
suggest that the University of Texas engaged in careful study
before concluding that a racially conscious admissions policy was
needed to achieve what it considered the essential educational
goal of student diversity. Given his distrust of the university,
however, Garza easily waves this off, suggesting that any
measure the university might employ here "would be subjective
and, at worst, capable of manipulation through framing
biases."10 5 Beyond the university's "core function"o6 of educating
students in specific traditional subjects, nothing about the
university gives it any special expertise in judging the importance
of such goals as promoting cross-racial understanding. Although
the university may treat such values as "self-styled educational
goals," it is in no better position than any other institution-
including the judiciary itself-to evaluate such goals. 107
In short, for Garza, deference to the university is simply a
mistake, a "digression in the course of constitutional law."108 The
fact that the case involves race obviously has much to do with
101. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 250 (5th Cir. 2011) (Garza, J.,
specially concurring), vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
102. See id. at 251 (Garza, J., specially concurring).
103. See id. at 252, 253 (Garza, J., specially concurring) ("Grutter rewards
admissions programs that remain opaque.").
104. Id. at 255.
105. Id. at 255 n.10.
106. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 257 (5th Cir. 2011) vacated
and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 247.
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Garza's refusal to defer.109 But his language suggests something
more than this. It suggests a skepticism that universities are
entitled to deference at all, especially once they move beyond
what Garza sees as their narrowly traditional "core function." It
all but accuses them of being undeserving of such trust
altogether.
The same distrust of universities is equally apparent in
Chief Judge Edith Jones's dissent from the denial of en banc
review of Fisher.110 If anything, Jones's dissent is more
contemptuous of the university, filled with a degree of disdain
that goes beyond a mere conclusion that deference is the wrong
doctrinal tool to apply in such cases. "University administrators
cherish the power to dispense admissions as they see fit," she
writes, adding with evident sarcasm that "even University
administrators can lose sight of the constitutional forest for the
academic trees.""' One gets the sense that if given free rein,
Jones would take an axe to those academic trees, cutting a
judicial swath through the groves of academe and whistling a
merry tune all the while.
Leaving unmentioned the Grutter Court's discussion of the
complexity of the educational decisions made by universities, 112
Jones writes that Grutter's discussion of educational decision-
making "was meant to challenge the university, not to bless
whatever rationale it advances for racially preferential
admissions."11 3  It is difficult to read this sentence without
concluding that Jones thinks the university's proffered rationales
are really just rationalizations: post hoc justifications for the
university to pursue the impermissible non-academic goal of
racial balancing. She not only questions whether it is
constitutionally appropriate for the university to seek racial
diversity at the classroom level, but suggests again that the
university would use such a goal dishonestly, treating it as "carte
blanche" to do what it wants.11 4 She agrees that a university is
entitled to deference on the narrow question of whether it has "a
compelling interest in achieving racial and other student
109. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 252, 247 (5th Cir. 2011)
vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
110. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 304 (Jones, C.J., dissenting) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
112. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
113. Fisher, 644 F.3d at 304.
114. Id. at 307.
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diversity," but concludes that "that is about as far as deference
should go.""'s
As with Judge Garza's opinion, then, Chief Judge Jones's
opinion can fairly be read as signaling more than a mere
conclusion that Grutter, and the Fifth Circuit, deferred to the
university too much or on the wrong question. Rather, it suggests
a generalized distrust of universities: a conviction that they
hardly merit any deference, that they are acting as social
reformers rather than genuine academics and would dither about
among the "academic trees" in any event, and that they will act
dishonestly to achieve their goal of racial balancing.
The same sarcasm and distrust toward universities played a
prominent role in the oral arguments when the Supreme Court
heard Fisher.'1 6  Again the argument was primarily doctrinal.
But, again, a strong undercurrent of skepticism toward
universities tout court is obviously at work here. It is most
prominent, unsurprisingly, in the questions asked by the usual
suspects. 117
This skepticism appears soon after the argument turns to
the merits, in a question by Justice Antonin Scalia suggesting
that the University of Texas, no matter what serious study it had
devoted to the issue by this time or how long it had had since the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Hopwood'18 to reconsider its admissions
policy, had simply reinstated "racial [quotas]" the second Grutter
came down, without any serious reflection or analysis at all.119 It
is evident in Chief Justice John Roberts's questioning of counsel
for the State of Texas on the issue of critical mass, in which he
responds to a laundry list of efforts undertaken by the university
to make a determination about critical mass with the skeptical
115. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 644 F.3d 301, 305 n.3 (5th Cir. 2011).
116. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/
argument-transcripts/11-345.pdf [hereinafter Fisher Oral Arg. Tr.].
117. But not the usual suspects alone. Although her questions may have been
designed as much to push the University of Texas to make its best case as to criticize
it, Justice Sonia Sotomayor's questions at oral argument also suggested a certain
degree of skepticism and exasperation with the university. See, e.g., id. at 5-6, 10,
14, 17.
118. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
119. Fisher Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 116, at 11.
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statement: "So, I say-when you tell me, that's good enough." 120
And it reaches its peak when Justice Scalia implies that the very
administrative bureaucracies that universities employ in making
"complex educational judgments" about admissions in fact reveal
the university to have been captured by these bureaucrats, who
have grown like kudzu and should just be eliminated:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Since we are asking questions just
about ... curiosity, I am curious to know how many-this is a
very ambitious racial program here at the University of
Texas. How many people are there in the affirmative action
department of the University of Texas? Do you have any
idea? There must be a lot of people to, you know, to monitor
all these classes and do all of this assessment of race
throughout the thing. There would be a large number of
people . . . out of a job, ... wouldn't [there], if we suddenly
went to just [a] 10 percent [plan]?' 21
That the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher might turn
substantially on the question of the proper scope of judicial
deference to universities surprised absolutely no one. The
contours of judicial deference to higher educational institutions-
indeed, whether there should be any deference at all, at least
where race is involved-were hotly contested by the dissenting
justices in Grutter. Not without reason, Justice Clarence Thomas
called the extent of deference shown to the University of
Michigan "unprecedented" in his passionate dissent in Grutter.122
Indeed, Thomas was skeptical that the university was entitled to
deference under either prong of the strict scrutiny analysis. With
respect to whether the law school had a compelling interest, he
questioned whether a racially diverse student body could be said
to provide any educational benefits at all, let alone whether a
compelling interest in student diversity could be said to exist.123
More broadly, Thomas cast doubt on the very "idea of 'educational
autonomy' grounded in the First Amendment"124 and made clear
120. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133
S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
oral-arguments/argument~transcripts/11-345.pdf.
121. Id. at 58.
122. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 350 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also id. at 380 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (calling the
majority's application of strict scrutiny "unprecedented in its deference").
123. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 356 n.4.
124. Id. at 362.
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his view that even if it existed, it hardly justified lessening the
rigor of judicial review in race-based Equal Protection cases.12 5
Justice Anthony Kennedy also dissented in Grutter. True to
form, he took a position between that of Justice Thomas and that
of the majority. He would have paid deference within limits with
respect to the compelling interest portion of the strict scrutiny
analysis, concluding that "[o]ur precedents provide a basis for the
Court's acceptance of a university's considered judgment that
racial diversity among students can further its educational task,
when supported by empirical evidence."12 6  But he charged that
the majority had "confuse[d] deference to a university's definition
of its educational objective with deference to the implementation
of this goal."127  The university might be entitled to deference
with respect to the selection of its goal of student diversity, and
that goal might constitute a compelling interest. But no
deference whatsoever should be given to its use of racial
classifications to implement the goal of educational diversity.128
Both before and after the oral argument in Fisher, it was
widely assumed that the outcome would turn on Justice
Kennedy's vote and on his view of the appropriate scope of
deference in the case.129 And so it did. Writing for the Court,
125. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 362-64 (2003) (questioning the
firmness of the foundations laid for constitutional academic freedom in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), and Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967), and emphasizing that the statutes in the latter case
"covered all public employees and were not invalidated only as applied to university
faculty members").
126. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 388.
128. See id. ("[D]eference is not to be given with respect to the methods by which
[racial diversity] is pursued.").
129. See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Is Honesty the Best (Judicial) Policy in
Affirmative Action Cases?: Fisher v. University of Texas Gives the Court (Yet)
Another Chance to Say Yes, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 77, 85-90 (2012); Bret D.
Asbury, The Fisher Oral Argument: Why Affirmative Action Might Endure, 9 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 107, 108, 117 (2013); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, The Diversity Paradox:
Judicial Review in an Age of Demographic and Educational Change, 65 VAND. L.
REV. EN BANC 113, 137-38 (2012); Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups
and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 463,
464-66 (2012); Lucille A. Jewel, Merit and Mobility: A Progressive View of Class,
Culture, and the Law, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 239, 299 (2012); Allen Rostron, Affirmative
Action, Justice Kennedy, and the Virtues of the Middle Ground, 107 Nw. U. L. REV.
1037 (2013); Girardeau A. Spann, Whatever, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 203, 206
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Justice Kennedy neither upheld Texas's program nor struck down
Grutter. Instead, he remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit for
failure to apply strict scrutiny correctly. He accepted Grutter's
conclusion that "the decision to pursue 'the educational benefits
that flow from student body diversity' that the University deems
integral to its mission is, in substantial measure, an academic
judgment to which some, but not complete, judicial deference is
proper."130  Provided that there is "a reasoned, principled
explanation for the academic decision," the courts should bow
out. 131
But Kennedy insisted that once the initial policy
determination is made, it is for the courts to determine "that the
admissions process meets strict scrutiny in its
implementation."1 3 2  In other words, deference as to ends, not
means; deference on what constitutes a compelling interest, not
on narrow tailoring. To be sure, even at the latter stage of strict
scrutiny analysis "a court can take account of a university's
experience and expertise in adopting or rejecting certain
admissions processes." 13 3  But the court must remain in the
driver's seat. 134 Contrary to Judge Higginbotham's opinion, it
must "second-guess the merits" of the university's
implementation of its educational goals where racial classification
is involved.1 3 1
Kennedy spoke for six other justices, with only one member
of the Court-Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg-dissenting. 136 That
might seem to belie the prediction that Kennedy would provide
the pivotal vote in the case. But there is more than one way to be
(2012).
130. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (quoting
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2419-20; see also id. at 2420 ("Grutter made clear that it is for the
courts, not for university administrators, to ensure that '[t]he means chosen to
accomplish the [government's] asserted purpose must be specifically and narrowly
framed to accomplish that purpose."' (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter, 539
U.S. at 333)).
133. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
134. See id. (noting that "it remains at all times ... the Judiciary's obligation to
determine, that the admissions processes" that applicants are not evaluated based on
their race or ethnicity).
135. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420-21 (2013) (quoting
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011)).
136. Justice Elena Kagan did not take part in the decision. Id. at 2422.
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a swing justice. It is fairly clear that Justice Kennedy called the
tune here, and that at least some of the liberal and conservative
justices reluctantly sang along. They joined his opinion because
it provided adequate security for their own views, and because
joining, with the hope of limiting the scope of Kennedy's
wanderings, was preferable to the risk of wrenching defeat from
victory. Fisher is a Kennedy product through and through.
That has certain consequences for the visibility-but not, I
think, the accuracy-of the basic points I have canvassed in this
Article: that the judicial view of the mission of universities, and of
the trustworthiness of universities and their entitlement to
judicial deference, were two major animating issues in Fisher.
Justice Kennedy is motivated more by judicial amour propre than
by distrust of--or even, perhaps, concern for-other
institutions.1 3 ' There was little need, and for Kennedy probably
no strong impetus, to use Fisher to take on the universities' own
amour propre and their insistence on academic autonomy.
Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.
To say these animating impulses were not clearly visible in
the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher is not to say they were
absent, however. It is often possible to glimpse deeper motives in
a judicial decision, motives that are just barely concealed by the
patina of doctrine.13 8  It is surely true that in the context of
affirmative action, the justices care more about race and equal
protection than they do about the mission of the university or the
judicial implications of academic freedom.13 9 The Court may have
meant what it said about academic freedom, university
autonomy, and judicial deference in Grutter. But it is less clear
137. For a rather positive statement of this position, see Louis D. Bilionis, Grand
Centrism and the Centrist Judicial Personam, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1353 (2005). For a less
admiring account, see Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARv. L.
REV. 31, 84-85 (2005). See, e.g., Stephen G. Bragaw & Barbara A. Perry, The
"Brooding Omnipresence" in Bush v. Gore: Anthony Kennedy, the Equality Principle,
and Judicial Supremacy, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 19, 29-31 (2002); Neal Devins,
Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 491, 527 (2010); Neil S. Siegel, Dole's Future: A Strategic
Analysis, 16 SUP. CT. EcON. REV. 165, 198 (2008).
138. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 137, at 52 ("There is almost no legal outcome that
a really skillful legal analyst cannot cover with a professional varnish."); Girardeau
A. Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 48, 54 (2012); Spann,
supra note 129, at 203-04, 207, 209.
139. See, e.g., HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 126;
Byrne, Threat, supra note 89, at 117.
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that it cared what it said about those topics, at least compared to
the central issue of race.
But the underlying questions about the mission of
universities and their entitlement to judicial deference are there
nonetheless, and were relevant to Fisher's fate in the Supreme
Court, just as they clearly were relevant in the Fifth Circuit.
Certainly they are doctrinally relevant. The narrower a
university's mission as the courts understand it, the less likely it
is that courts will defer to the university's claim that it has a
compelling interest in matters that stray from that core mission.
The more that courts trust or distrust universities, the more
likely it is that they will expand or contract the scope of judicial
deference. The general doctrinal gloss offered by Justice
Kennedy's opinion may have passed lightly over those issues, but
they did not disappear. They remain present and unresolved.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF DISTRUST OF (ACADEMIC)
INSTITUTIONS
If I am right that there is a lack of judicial consensus about
the mission of universities and about the degree to which
universities are entitled to deference when they make academic
decisions, that should concern universities and those who
champion academic freedom, whether as a legal or a professional
principle. How universities fare in the courts, and in the court of
public opinion, will depend considerably on how much they are
trusted-and on what, exactly, they are trusted to do.
Although Fisher brings these questions to the surface, they
are not new. Nor are these questions likely to be confined to the
context of race-conscious admissions. Not long after the Supreme
Court's decision in Grutter, J. Peter Byrne wrote to express
concern about a "trend of decisions justifying greater judicial
intrusion into academic decision making," decisions that taken
together "imperil[ ] the constitutional autonomy of colleges and
universities protected by the First Amendment." 140 Similarly, in
her book The Trials of Academe: The New Era of Campus
Litigation, Amy Gajda argued that the era of "courts allow[ing]
universities to run their own shop" is over. 141  Judges are
increasingly willing to tread on ground they once would have left
140. Byrne, Threat, supra note 89, at 79, 82.




to the universities to police for themselves. Small wonder that
another doyen of academic freedom jurisprudence wondered
recently whether judicial deference to academic decision-making
had become "an outmoded concept." 142
Before asking why things seem to have changed, it is worth
emphasizing that there are several issues at work here. Because
they are closely related, it is easy to conflate them. That would
be a mistake. In surveying the terrain, we should be aware of
several distinct questions.
First, what is the mission of the university? Should it be
broadly or narrowly understood? Is it confined to traditional
actions such as research, teaching, and scholarship? Does it
depend on traditional values such as truth seeking and
impartiality? Or has the university's mission expanded in a way
that more directly implicates broader goals, such as ameliorating
social inequality and opening a path to leadership?
Second, how deserving are universities of deference, whether
from judges or from non-academics in general? Do they continue
to possess a level of expertise and authority that deserves and
demands deference from outsiders? If not, is it because the very
idea that an institution's authority and expertise provide
sufficient reasons for judges and others to defer has been
discredited, in favor of the view that no institution should be
insulated from democratic control or judicial supervision? Or is it
because universities in particular have lost the trust they once
enjoyed?
Third, how should judges, in particular, treat universities?
Should academic autonomy, or academic freedom, be
constitutional principles at all? Should universities continue to
enjoy a judicial presumption of good faith and independence? Or
are judges as qualified to judge a university's conduct as they are
any other institution?
Finally, there is an often-ignored question that may affect
how we answer all of the prior questions. This is the question of
institutional pluralism.1 4 8 There are several thousand public and
142. Robert M. O'Neil, Judicial Deference to Academic Decisions: An Outmoded
Concept?, 36 J.C. & U.L. 729 (2010) (canvassing courts and scholars that have
observed or exemplified a decline of judicial deference toward academic decisions).
143. For discussion, see HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note
16, at 19. See also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAw SCHOOLS 31 (2012); Matthew
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private colleges and universities in the United States, ranging
from purely teaching-oriented community colleges to flagship
doctorate-granting research institutions. Must they all have the
same mission? If their missions differ, as they inevitably will,
should any legal protection or judicial deference these institutions
receive be limited to or depend on their adopting some set of core
academic functions or values? How much variation between
those functions and values should be acknowledged and
protected? 144 Rather than focusing on core functions and values,
should we instead take a cue from the institutions themselves,
acknowledging the existence of different missions and holding
each institution to its own stated mission, but reducing deference
when they depart from those missions?
The question of institutional pluralism has both professional
and legal implications. On a professional level, there may be
disagreement about the proper function or values of an
"academic" institution. That question is compounded when we
ask how courts should deal with this question. Some legal
scholars have focused on protecting a particular set of academic
values and effectively enshrining them within the definition of
constitutional academic freedom. 145  If we take that approach,
how fixed should that definition be, and what risk does it present
that courts will reify a particular understanding of the academic
mission without acknowledging the possibility that academic
missions may evolve, at one institution or across the academy?
W. Finkin, On 'Institutional'Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 829-40 (1983);
Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment's Epistemological Problem, 87 WASH. L. REV.
445, 491-92 (2012); Jerome Organ, Missing Missions: Further Reflections on
Institutional Pluralism (Or its Absence), 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (2010). For a
concerned but, in my view, overheated take on institutional pluralism, see also Jos6
Gabilondo, Institutional Pluralism From the Standpoint of its Victims: Calling the
Question on Indiscriminate (In)tolerance, 21 LAW & LITERATURE 387 (2009).
144. Commenting on an earlier draft of this Article, Rick Garnett adds another
question: Should we answer these questions differently when public rather than
private universities are involved? We might accept a good deal of pluralism within
the universe of private universities but less-or none-from public universities. I
thank him for the reminder. I deal with that question at greater length in Horwitz,
Universities, supra note 16, at 1524-26, and HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 141-43. In brief, my view is that while the public
status of some universities might limit their options, it does so less than we might
expect, and that their status as universities is more salient for purposes of legal
analysis than their status as state entities. As a practical matter, moreover, I
suspect that the range of choices that public universities might make in shaping
their mission would generally fall within constitutionally acceptable lines.
145. See, e.g., Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 22, at 333-38.
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Another possibility, one I have advocated, is that given the
existence of institutional pluralism within the universe of higher
educational institutions, courts should not only defer to academic
decisions made by universities, but should also be deferential
about whether a particular university's mission can properly be
conceived of as "academic," and thus entitled to judicial
deference. 146 But if we fail to arrive at a fixed legal
understanding of core academic values, will we risk dissipating
any legal protection for academic freedom altogether? 14 7  This
tension between institutional pluralism and a more
particularized, singular, fixed understanding of the university
mission and academic values has been around for some time. 14 8
It is worth laying out in detail these different issues, and the
questions they raise, because one need not have the same answer
to all of these questions. One might, for example, believe that
there is room for institutional pluralism among universities: that
different universities may have different emphases or values and
different goals but they all deserve the label "academic." But
someone taking this position, and whatever beliefs about
professional academic freedom follow from it, might nevertheless
believe that when it comes to constitutional academic freedom, we
will gain more and risk less if we avoid the thicket of institutional
pluralism at the legal level, and instead concentrate on a core set
of fixed academic values that merit constitutional protection.
Conversely, one might take a fairly fixed and traditional
position on the proper mission of the university. One might
conclude, for example, that the core mission of the university is to
seek the truth impartially, and that more political or postmodern
goals are inconsistent with genuine academic values.149  But
despite taking sides in that conflict, the same person might
believe that this is an academic debate that should take place
146. See, e.g., Horwitz, Universities, supra note 16, at 1547-48. For a related and
complementary, but somewhat different, take on judicial deference to universities,
see Eboni S. Nelson, In Defense of Deference: The Case for Respecting Educational
Autonomy and Expert Judgments in Fisher v. Texas, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1133 (2013).
147. See Horwitz, Universities, supra note 16, at 1547.
148. See Karen Petroski, Lessons for Academic Freedom Law: The California
Approach to University Autonomy and Accountability, 32 J.C. & U.L. 149, 151-52,
159-60, 191, 208-12 (2005). See generally Finkin, supra note 143 (arguing that there
is a distinction between "academic freedom" and universities' institutional
autonomy).
149. See generally Rabban, supra note 33 (laying out the debate between
traditional and postmodern conceptions of the university and academic freedom).
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between academics. At the level of constitutional rather than
professional academic freedom, one might believe that the
appropriate approach, given the limitations of judges, is for courts
to take a capacious view of the university mission and the
meaning of academic values or academic freedom, deferring
substantially to different academic visions while allowing that
debate to percolate within the academy.
In short, thinking about academics' debates about the nature
of the university and the definition of academic decisions or
academic freedom is different from thinking about the judicial
resolution of similar questions. One may reach different answers
depending on one's conclusions about where the final decisional
authority resides: in the universities or in the courts. These
distinctions, and the multitude of possible approaches they
suggest, are not always appreciated, even by experts on the law of
academic freedom. They are certainly not always recognized
among the general run of academics, who may simply assume
that professional academic freedom and constitutional academic
freedom are synonymous. Unsurprisingly, they are rarely
appreciated by judges, who after all are generalists.
That all this matters is evident from a contrasting reading of
some of the opinions we have seen so far. Consider, on the one
hand, Judge Higginbotham's opinion in Fisher, which assumed
that different universities may have different goals and suggested
that how these institutions fare under strict scrutiny will depend
on the particular context facing each institution. Compare this
opinion with Justice Alito's dissent in Martinez, which implied
that any university that aligns itself with what he sees as the
"prevailing standards of political correctness in our country's
institutions of higher learning" is departing from traditional
academic values and may be entitled to less deference, or none at
all.15 o Once these debates over the role of the university, which
are routine among academics, shift from an academic forum to a
judicial forum, they may have a significant and lasting effect on
the nature and scope of universities' legal rights.
My own view, which I have offered at much greater length
elsewhere, 15 1 is that our discussions of academic freedom,
150. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
151. See, e.g., HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 117,
119, 139-40; Horwitz, Grutter, supra note 16, at 502.
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whether as a professional or a constitutional value, must
acknowledge the inevitability of institutional pluralism, and
recognize its importance, more than they generally do. Even if
one readily grants that some institutional goals and values fall
outside any reasonable definition of the modern university and its
mission, there is still a great deal of room for variety within the
crowded environment of American higher educational
institutions, public and private. Professional debates about the
nature of the university should not be too quick to adopt too
monistic or too fixed a definition of the university and its mission.
Similarly, when making their case to courts, universities and
academic organizations, especially when acting as amici, should
point out that few if any universities look and act precisely the
same as they did 100 or fifty years ago. Within the current
environment, different universities-such as a large public
research university and a small religious college-may have
different goals, missions, and values, all of them still sheltering
under the big tent of the academy. Courts should not only defer
to academic goals and decisions; they should be at least somewhat
deferential about what constitutes a proper academic goal or
decision.152  If there is no room for professional and legal
pluralism in a nation with a substantial tradition of pluralism15 3
and thousands of public and private colleges and universities,
then there is no room for pluralism at all.
In one sense, decisions like Grutter or Judge Higginbotham's
opinion in Fisher offer encouragement for those who champion
both judicial deference and respect for institutional pluralism.
Grutter, after all, was at least ostensibly not based on the view
that universities must pursue student body diversity, including
racial diversity. Rather, it was grounded on the view that
whether to pursue diversity is an academic decision, protected by
the constitutional value of academic autonomy and entitled to
152. Cf. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 30 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer,
C.J., dissenting) (insisting that only a "substantial departure from academic norms"
can justify judicial second-guessing of an academic decision). The "substantial
departure" language comes from Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
225 (1985).
153. See generally ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE
SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012) (discussing citizens'
allegiances to a wide range of non-state authorities and arguing for an
understanding of "permeable sovereignty" in which those authorities stand on an
equal footing with the state).
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substantial judicial deference.15 4 Similarly, Judge Higginbotham,
in upholding the University of Texas's policy, did not insist that
the University of Texas must look and act exactly like the
University of Michigan Law School or that every university must
in turn look and act like the University of Texas. Rather, he
acknowledged that the constitutionality of different universities'
actions required "some consideration of a university's particular
educational mission and the community it serves."1 55
Although the Supreme Court ultimately vacated and
remanded the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Court's opinion in
Fisher, while narrowing the occasions for judicial deference, did
not impose a particular view of which educational goals are
proper or improper for universities. Even the Supreme Court's
rather mechanical doctrinal decision in the Christian Legal
Society case did not insist that all universities must treat student
groups exactly the same and that no university may opt not to
apply non-discrimination policies to student groups. It turned on
the view that Hastings College of the Law could impose an all-
comers policy, not that it must.156
There is thus good reason to think that the legal doctrine of
academic freedom and educational autonomy continues to leave a
space open for institutional pluralism. Cases like Grutter and
Fisher, taken together, suggest that universities that believe that
student body diversity, including racial diversity, is an important
part of their academic mission, and can provide a "reasoned,
principled explanation for" that view,15 7 will be entitled to pursue
that educational goal without the goal being second-guessed by
the courts. (Although, as Fisher now makes clear, they will still
have to give strong evidence that they selected the most
appropriate means of implementing that goal.) Read properly,
however, these cases also suggest that universities may reject
that goal. They may, for instance, decide that the best way to
admit students is through a narrow, grade-oriented focus on the
merits of the students, or through a first-come-first-served
admissions policy, even if that approach does not result in a
racially diverse student body. Institutional pluralism means that
154. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-29 (2003).
155. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 237 (5th Cir. 2011) (emphasis
added), vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
156. Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
157. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
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there is room for a diversity of academic goals among colleges and
universities-including, so to speak, diversity about diversity.
There is still ample cause for concern, however. It comes
from multiple sources, with varied views. The courts themselves
provide some reason for concern. Some justices may pay lip
service to academic autonomy in cases like Grutter or Christian
Legal Society. In truth, they may be more interested in upholding
affirmative action or non-discrimination policies, not in protecting
academic autonomy for its own sake.'5 8 If that is so, then there
would be reason to question whether they would be as eager to
rhapsodize about academic autonomy if a university pursued
academic goals that were contrary to those justices' own social
views.
The concerns may also come from within the university
itself. Some academics might insist that there is a single right
answer to the question of what constitutes a proper academic
mission. It might be the traditional version. This is the version
advanced by Judge Garza, Justice Alito, or those judges who have
offered jeremiads against "political correctness" and asserted that
courts have an obligation to step in to save the university from
itselfl59 and should not defer simply because particular
universities see their mission differently. It may come from the
other side: from those who reject the notion of institutional
pluralism and insist that some non-traditional, largely political,
goals must be pursued by all universities.160 Or it may come from
those who fall in between, insisting on traditional conceptions of
the university mission but in a way that is designed to serve what
might be crudely termed liberal political goals.161 All of these
positions threaten to undermine institutional pluralism, and may
imperil academic institutional autonomy to boot.
Beyond any specific positions, moreover, there is a deeper
concern, one that was clearly present at every level of litigation in
158. See HORwITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 126, 137.
159. See supra notes 48-59, 76-82 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Gabilondo, supra note 143, at 388-89 (rejecting institutional
pluralism when it "provides a disguise for retrograde values in the legal academy" on
such issues as the treatment of sexual minorities).
161. See, e.g., Lonnie D. Kliever, Academic Freedom and Church-Affiliated
Universities, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1988) (arguing that traditional principles of
academic freedom should apply equally to religious and non-religious universities,
and asserting in a distinctly monistic fashion that "[w]hat is at stake is nothing less
than the meaning and mission of the modern university" (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 59526
2013] Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust 527
Fisher. This is the question of trust. The existence of a
constitutional principle of academic freedom or university
autonomy depends on others having trust in the authority and
expertise of universities and their faculty and administrators.
Without that trust, universities stand little chance of success in
asserting a right to legal autonomy or judicial deference. And
that trust is dissipating.
Some of this is for general reasons. Institutions of all sorts,
public and private, increasingly fail to maintain the confidence of
the public, and the public shows less and less willingness to defer
to experts and authorities.1 62  But some of it is specific to
universities themselves. Public confidence in colleges and
universities, while still high, has dropped in recent years. 16
Judicial confidence in university faculty and administrators has
also diminished.1 64
What is true about universities in general is even truer of
university admissions. The oral arguments in Fisher were
packed with skeptical remarks about universities and their
admissions processes.165  Supporters of affirmative action are
sometimes equally distrusting. The entire point of Justice
Ginsburg's dissent in Fisher, after all, is that we ought to allow
162. See Byrne, Threat, supra note 89, at 132-33 (noting a general loss of
confidence in the capacity of professionals to govern themselves); Horwitz, supra note
143, at 491 (discussing this phenomenon and collecting sources).
163. See Chris Panetta, Colleges and Universities Not Immune From Eroding
Public Confidence, WIDMEYER COMM., http://www.widmeyer.com/blogs/colleges-and-
universities-not-immune-eroding-public-confidence (last visited Oct. 9, 2013)
(referring to surveys conducted in 2012); Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the
Press, Colleges Viewed Positively, But Conservatives Express Doubts, PEW RES.
CENTER (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.people-press.org/2012/03/01/colleges-viewed-
positively-but-conservatives-express-doubts/; Confidence in Congress Stays at Lowest
Point in Fifty Years, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (May 21, 2012),
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris%20Poll%2044%20-%20Confidence%20
Index_5%2021%2012.pdf.
164. See Byrne, Threat, supra note 89, at 132.
165. See, e.g., Fisher Oral Arg. Tr., supra note 116, at 11 (Scalia, J.) (suggesting
that the University of Texas "reinstitute[d] racial [quotas]" more or less reflexively
the second the Grutter decision was handed down), 32-33 (Roberts, C.J.) (probing,
and gently mocking, the University of Texas's procedures for identifying the race of
applicants), 48 (suggesting that the idea that the Court should defer to universities
on the question whether students feel racially isolated if the university amounts to
saying, "when you [the university] tell me, that's good enough"), 57-58 (Scalia, J.)
(questioning the size of "the affirmative action department of the University of
Texas" and suggesting that "[t]here would be a large number of people ... out of a
job" if the university switched entirely to a top ten percent plan).
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universities to be openly race-conscious because they will do so
covertly anyway.166  Academic observers agree.1 67  There is a
widespread sense that "diversity" itself can be something of a
subterfuge: that it vaulted into the top ranks of academic goals
and values less because those who invoke it care about it deeply
or even know what it means, but because it is the only basis for
affirmative action that the Supreme Court has accepted. 16s
Nor are university admissions offices and their allies always
their own best friends when it comes to reducing judicial or public
distrust. Data are often hard to come by, especially when the
person seeking those data is a potential critic of university
admissions policies and their educational outcomes. 169  To
outsiders, it may sometimes seem as if scholars, data collectors,
admissions offices, and university officials worry that the full
disclosure of information about university admissions and
outcomes will imperil those admissions programs and harm the
talented students who might benefit from those programs. That
is not a legitimate reason to fail to fully disclose all available
information.
166. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) ("[I]f universities cannot explicitly include race as a factor, many may
resort to camouflage to maintain their minority enrollment." (quotations and citation
omitted)).
167. See, e.g., Clowney, supra note 11, at 33 (citing Richard Thompson Ford,
Fisher Cut Bait: Affirmative Action Will Live on Even if the Supreme Court Kills it,
SLATE (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:21 P.M.), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and_politics/
jurisprudence/2012/10/affirmativeaction_atthesupreme courtthefuture.html).
168. See Anita Bernstein, Diversity May Be Justified, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 201, 203-05
(2012) (collecting examples of judges and scholars criticizing diversity rhetoric as
something of a sham, or defending it for strategic reasons, not for its own sake);
Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 577-78 (2000) (observing that
"diversity," in the wake of Bakke, had "become the favorite catchword-indeed, it
would not be an exaggeration to say 'mantra'-of those defending the use of racial or
ethnic preferences," in large measure "because such [rhetoric] seem[s] licensed and,
indeed, encouraged by the Supreme Court").
169. See, e.g., RICHARD H. SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR., MISMATCH: How
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT'S INTENDED TO HELP, AND WHY
UNIVERSITIES WON'T ADMIT IT 175-246 (2012) (detailing the authors' difficulties
prying loose information about admissions and post-graduation outcomes from
universities and other institutions); Richard H. Sander, Listening to the Debate on
Reforming Law School Admissions Preferences, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 889, 951-52
(2011) (discussing Sander's research plan of using State bar data to gather
information and the difficulties he is facing with executing the plan); Richard H.
Sander, A Reply to Critics, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1963, 1983-84 (2005) (discussing
difficulties in obtaining data).
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Justice Kennedy's opinion in Fisher, which demands a much
more searching judicial evaluation of university admissions
policies under the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, may
bring that era of relative opacity to an end. 170 In the meantime,
recalcitrance on the part of universities to provide full data to all
those who seek it can only deepen the sense of distrust that those
outside the admissions process-including judges-may harbor
toward higher educational institutions. Universities' insistence
that their admissions policies fall within the scope of "complex
educational judgments" 71 that lie within their expertise and
outside the purview of courts, even if true, may fall on deaf ears if
they are distrusted by the courtS.172 That will be especially true if
the courts become convinced, rightly or wrongly, that admissions
offices are operating as bureaucratic fiefdoms of their own, rather
than working under the control and supervision of university
faculty. 173
We may learn something about just how distrustful courts
are of universities, and what effects this distrust may have, when
the Fifth Circuit takes up the Fisher case again on remand. For
the truth is that although Judge Higginbotham's original panel
opinion only required the University of Texas to show a good-faith
process of working toward the compelling goal of student
diversity,174 the university did far more than that. The record
showed an extraordinary amount of work on the university's part:
substantial review and discussion of its mission, the use of a
variety of carefully selected means of achieving the permissible
end of student diversity, careful adjustment and re-adjustment in
170. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) ("Strict
scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a school's assertion that its admissions
process uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the
evidence of how the process works in practice." (emphasis added)).
171. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
172. Cf. John 0. McGinnis, A Politics of Knowledge, NAT'L AFFAIRS, Winter 2012,
at 58, 59 (warning that sources of "expertise and social-scientific knowledge,"
specifically "experts and bureaucrats," have become full of "arrogance and
insularity"). In comments on a draft of this Article, Fred Schauer makes the
important point that even if courts or others believe universities are indeed experts
where academic matters are concerned, they may still distrust them if they believe
that the universities' arguments are self-interested and thus require more intrusive
scrutiny. I am grateful to Schauer for this point.
173. Cf. HORwITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS, supra note 16, at 135
(making a similar point about law school employment recruiting offices).
174. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011)
(emphasis added), vacated and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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light of both Texas law and intervening judicial decisions, ample
empirical research, and serious deliberation about both means
and ends. This was no slapdash affair. It was a remarkably full
and careful effort on the part of the university. Higginbotham
was right to conclude that "the efforts of the University have been
studied, serious, and of high purpose, lending support to a
constitutionally protected zone of discretion.""'
Even under genuinely strict scrutiny, in my view, the
University of Texas met and exceeded its constitutional
obligations. It is pointless to try to predict the future or to
anticipate the outcome of particular cases. But certainly nothing
in Justice Kennedy's opinion in isher requires the Fifth Circuit
to reject the University of Texas's admissions policy. If the court
nevertheless rejects the university's policy on remand, we may be
driven back to the question I have asked in this Section: How
much-or little-do courts and others trust universities, their
good faith and expertise? And is that distrust hampering
universities' ability to succeed in the courts and carry out their
academic missions at home?
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have suggested that there are deeper
questions lying just beneath the surface of the usual doctrinal
wrangling in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. The
Supreme Court's fairly typical focus on doctrinal details obscures
but does not conceal a set of underlying conflicts that increasingly
characterize the courts' reaction to cases involving universities,
academic freedom, and judicial deference. Affirmative action
cases like Fisher and Grutter suggest a deeper debate over
several related questions: What is the core mission of the
university? Is it a single mission, one that applies to all
universities-or is there room for institutional pluralism within
the larger universe of higher educational institutions? Should
courts defer to universities at all, and when? In answering that
question, should courts defer only within the scope of their
understanding of what constitutes a genuine matter for academic
judgment-or should they be deferential about what constitutes
175. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 231 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated
and remanded by 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); see id. at 222-31 (detailing the university's
efforts); Gerald Torres, The Education of an Admissions Office, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 211, 214-15 (2012).
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an academic judgment as well?' 76
Running through many of these questions is a still more
basic question. That is the question of institutional allocation of
decision-making responsibility between universities and courts.177
In the heyday of academic abstention doctrine,' 7 8 the assumption
was that "colleges and universities are best managed by their
own."17 9 Aggressive intervention into the judgments and affairs
of a university was beyond the competence of the courts and
would "likely destroy something uniquely valuable in higher
education."'
That freedom from judicial intervention did not require
universities to satisfy the courts that they met some exacting
judicial definition of the purpose and nature of higher education.
It did not, to recall Justice Alito's dissent in the Christian Legal
Society case, require universities to satisfy the courts that they
favored "political correctness"-or that they opposed it.'8 ' Nor
did it prevent universities from debating the nature of their
mission and, sometimes, changing it.182 The judicial commitment
176. Cf. GAJDA, supra note 141, at 248 (arguing in favor of "a buffer zone in which
wrongful action may well have occurred, but not sufficiently clearly to warrant risks
of judicial intervention in the intellectual life of the university"); Horwitz,
Universities, supra note 16, at 118.
177. For general discussion, see HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 16. For a classic discussion of comparative institutional analysis, see NEIL
K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). For a recent statement, see Neil Komesar,
The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: Reflections on Forty Years in the
Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265 (2013). For useful discussions of comparative
institutional analysis in the context of constitutional law and judicial deference, see
Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision Making,
98 IOWA L. REV. 465 (2013); Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and
Administrative Law Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029
(2011); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821
(2008).
178. See Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 22, at 323-27 (describing academic
abstention as "the traditional refusal of courts to extend to common law rules of
liability to colleges where doing so would interfere with the college administration's
good faith performance of its core functions"); GAJDA, supra note 141, at 22-50.
179. GAJDA, supra note 141, at 33.
180. Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 22, at 326.
181. See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3000 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
182. The Supreme Court's famous decision in Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) is illustrative. As Amy Gajda reminds us, that case
involved the decision of Dartmouth College's trustees to reorganize the university
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was not to protect the freedom of universities to act as judges-
whether moved by a particular notion of liberty or equality or
simply by nostalgia for their own college days-would have them
act. It was to protect the autonomy of universities and allow
them to act and evolve as the universities saw fit, exercising their
own independent authority and expertise. To be sure,
constitutional academic freedom has long been associated with a
particular (and admirable) vision of the university as an
impartial truth-seeker, one that values "knowledge [as] its own
end, not merely a means to an end," and favors "hypothesis" over
"dogma." 183 These values continue to animate most universities,
even if they are sometimes honored in the breach. But more
important still to constitutional academic freedom than any
particular vision of the university is the principle that the
university deserves "control over its academic destiny,"1 84 to
formulate its own academic goals and policies-for good or ill.
There may be some core values from which the university cannot
stray too far, but they should be understood broadly and
deferentially. The question what a university is and how it
should act belongs to the universities, not to the courts.
There is certainly evidence that, despite Grutter and despite
Fisher's reaffirmation that universities deserve deference on at
least some matters, the pendulum has shifted away from
university autonomy and toward a greater degree of judicial
supervision.185 The question of how to allocate decision-making
authority between universities and courts remains a live one.
Whether openly or implicitly, it is a question that underlies all of
along more "sectarian" lines, as against a state effort "to put Dartmouth on a more
ecumenical course." GAJDA, supra note 141, at 26. By "offer[ing] a significant new
measure of protection to the operational independence of colleges and universities,"
id. at 29, the Supreme Court effectively also gave them the discretion to adopt
differing missions. Matthew Finkin concludes that "the Dartmouth College case has
been read correctly to embrace a fundamental [judicial] commitment to institutional
pluralism per se." Finkin, supra note 143, at 833.
183. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result); see also Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 22, at 333-34
(describing the primary value of the university as one of "[d]isinterested scholarship
and research").
184. Byrne, Academic Freedom, supra note 22, at 330.
185. See Byrne, Threat, supra note 89, at 79 (arguing that "judicial interpretations
of constitutional academic freedom in the past decade seemed to be sliding toward a
dangerous distrust of academic decision making"); GAJDA, supra note 141, at 6
(arguing that even with respect to academic decisions, "courts have shown increasing
willingness to intervene" in disputes involving universities).
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the various opinions in Fisher, both in the Fifth Circuit and the
Supreme Court.
The answer to that question, and the other questions raised
here, will ultimately depend on trust. Whether and how much
courts and others trust universities is a crucial implicit question,
not just in Grutter and Fisher but across a range of cases and
controversies that confront the universities inside and outside the
courtroom. It may be hidden by Justice Kennedy's doctrinal gloss
in Fisher, but the question of trust is an animating force in the
Fifth Circuit opinions in that case, in the oral argument in the
Supreme Court in Fisher, and in countless other judicial and
public discussions. I think the evidence in Fisher suggests that
the University of Texas earned a great deal of trust in that case,
given its extensive study and deliberation concerning its
admissions policies. We will have to wait to see if the Fifth
Circuit agrees on remand. But Fisher, and the issue of
affirmative action in university admissions generally, is far from
the only dispute in which public and judicial trust in universities
will be at issue and likely to affect the outcome.
If that is so, it is not the fault of the courts or the public
alone. Universities bear a significant share of the responsibility.
It may be true that in our own time, there is little public trust in
any institution."' But universities have earned some of that
distrust on their own. If insulation from public pressure and hot-
button disputes is a strength of the university, insularity is also
one of its greatest vulnerabilities.
Those of us who believe that universities are entitled to a
substantial scope of judicial deference in the exercise of academic
judgments, and that what constitutes the subject of a proper
academic judgment is itself a question entitled to deference, must
work on our own to demonstrate that the trust we ask for is well-
placed.'"' We have an obligation to make sure that the "academic
judgments" made by universities are academic judgments, made
or scrutinized by academics. We must supervise, monitor, and
criticize the policy judgments made by universities, whether on
admissions or on other issues, to make sure that they are
genuinely consistent with our stated missions as individual
186. See Horwitz, supra note 143, at 491.
187. See Horwitz, Deference, supra note 16, at 1102. For a similar argument in the
context of religious institutions, see Horwitz, Ministerial Exception, supra note 17.
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universities. We must, perforce, debate what the mission of each
university is. And, given some of our most widely shared
academic values, we should make sure that our policies on
admissions and other issues are based on real data and genuine
academic deliberation, and that those data and deliberations are
widely and publicly shared, including with critics of those
policies.
I still believe that universities, and not courts, ought to have
the final word on university policy, even where particular policies
might be wrong or misguided. The responsibility for making
academic judgments continues to rest primarily if not solely with
the academy, not the courts-even, within broad limits, where
race and university admissions are concerned. The freedom to
make those decisions, and sometimes to make the wrong decision,
is what academic autonomy and academic freedom means. But it
is as much a responsibility as a right. The universities must not
abdicate that responsibility, just as the courts ought not grasp it
for themselves.
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